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The Emerging Stowaway: Patients'
Rights in the 1980s
by George J. Annas, J.D., M.P.H.
At one point in Edgar Allan Poe's
Narrative of Arthur Gordon Pyr of Nan-
tucket, Pym, who has stowed away in
the hold of a whaling vessel, believes he
has been abandoned and that the hold
will be his tomb. He expressed sensa-
tions of "extreme horror and dismay,"
and "the most gloomy imaginings, in
which the dreadful deaths of thirst,
famine, suffocation, and premature in-
terment, crowded in as the prominent
disasters to be encountered."
It is probably uncommon for hospi-
talized patients to feel as gloomy as
Pym. Nevertheless, installed in a
strange institution, separated from
friends and family, forced to wear a de-
grading costume, confined to bed, and
attended to by a variety of strangers
who may or may not keep the patient
informed of what they are doing, the
average patient is intimidated and
disoriented. Such an environment en-
courages dependence and discourages
the assertion of individual rights.
As the physician-director of Bos-
ton's Beth Israel Hospital has warned:
"today's hospital stands increasingly
to become a jungle, whose pathways to
the uninitiated are poorly marked and
fraught with danger ...'" In this
jungle the notion that patients have
rights that demand respect is often
foreign.
The movement for enhanced pa-
tients' rights is based on two premises:
(1) citizens possess certain rights that
are not automatically forfeited by en-
tering into a relationship with a physi-
cian or a health care facility; and (2)
most physicians and health care facili-
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ties fail to recognize these rights, fail to
provide for their protection or asser-
tion, and limit their exercise without
recourse.
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The primary argument against pa-
tients' rights is that patients have
"needs" and that defining these needs
in terms of rights leads to the creation
of an unhealthy adversary relation-
ship.3 It is not, however, the creation
of rights, but the disregard of them,
that produces adversaries. When pro-
vider and patient work together in an
atmosphere of mutual trust and un-
derstanding, the articulation of rights
can only enhance their relationship.
Many issues, however, cannot be re-
solved entirely within the provider-
patient relationship. Providers not
only have formal relationships with
their patients but also have relation-
ships with other providers, health care
institutions, and numerous govern-
mental agencies. A provider's relation-
ship with these institutions and indi-
viduals is often a very complex one,
and providers often find themselves
confused and therefore submissive in
cases where they do not understand
their own rights or those of their
patients.
Rights in Health Care
In most instances, both the health care
provider and the patient will be better
off if the status of the law regarding
both patient and provider rights is un-
derstood, and the means of change or
challenge well delineated.4 I would go
even further. An understanding of the
law can be as important to the proper
care of patients as an understanding of
emergency medical procedures or
proper drug dosages. But how are
rights to be understood, and how does
a person know that he or she has a
"right" to something?
There is a formidable amount of lit-
erature on rights in the archives of phi-
losophy and jurisprudence. Rather
than review it, let me note briefly the
thoughts of two relatively recent en-
trants who have written with great in-
sight. The first is John Rawls. In ex-
pounding his Theory of Justice,' he
imagines that a group of men and
women come together to form a social
contract. These individuals all have or-
dinary tastes, talents, ambitions, and
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convictions, but each is temporarily
unaware of his own personality and
best interests and must agree to the
terms of the contract before his aware-
ness of his own identity is restored.
The theory postulates that under such
circumstances all will agree to two
principles: (1) each person shall enjoy
the most extensive liberty, compatible
with a like liberty for others; and (2)
inequalities in wealth and power
should exist only where they work to
the benefit of the worst-off members of
society. One could develop an entire
system of patients' rights that rests on
these premises. Such a document
would be strongly pro-patient since
this group is currently the one that
generally lacks rights and is always the
group that will be viewed as "worst-
off" in the health care setting.
A second approach is suggested by
the writings of Ronald Dworkin in his
book of essays Taking Rights Seriously.6
Dworkin notes the great confusion in
"rights language," generally created by
attributing to it different meanings in
different contexts: "In most cases
when we say that someone has a right
to something, we imply that it would
be wrong to interfere with his doing it,
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or at least that some special grounds
are needed for justifying an interfer-
ence." An example is the right to
spend one's money the way one
pleases. This is, of course, different
from saying that the way one spends
one's money, e.g., gambling it away, is
the "right" thing to do, or that there is
nothing "wrong" with it. When we
speak of patients' rights, this distinc-
tion may be critical to understanding
what we are talking about. For ex-
ample, a woman may have a legal right
to have an abortion, but such a deci-
sion may still be considered "wrong"
by her.
Dworkin argues further that there
are some rights that can be said to be
fundamental in the sense that the gov-
ernment is bound to recognize and
protect them. Such rights, which we
often denote as "legal rights," and less
frequently as "constitutional rights,"
are generally spelled out in statutes
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and court decisions. By respecting
such rights, the government guaran-
tees to the weakest members of the so-
ciety that they will not be trampled on
by the strongest. In Dworkin's words:
The bulk of the law-that part
which defines and implements so-
cial, economic, and foreign pol-
icy-cannot be neutral. It must
state, in its greatest part, the ma-
jority's view of the common
good. The institution of rights is
therefore crucial, because it rep-
resents the majority's promise to
the minorities that their dignity
and equality will be respected.
When the divisions among the
groups are most violent, then this
gesture, if law is to work, must be
most sincere.., taking individ-
ual rights seriously is the one fea-
ture that distinguishes law from
ordered brutality.'
Without going too far afield, one
can apply Dworkin's notion directly
to health care and note that rights can
form a useful means of guaranteeing
to defenseless patients that they will
be treated with human dignity and re-
spect. While the health care provider
often has the power to deny certain
rights almost at will, he or she does
this only at the peril of jeopardizing
the integrity of the health care system
itself.
The AHA Bill of Rights
It must strike most as ironic that the
first major health care organization to
put forward a patients' bill of rights
was the American Hospital Associ-
ation, an organization composed pri-
marily of hospital administrators. One
would not expect landlords to pen a
bill of rights for tenants, police for sus-
pects, or wardens for prisoners. Nor
would one reasonably expect that the
hospital administrator's view on rights
for patients would be the same as ei-
ther the patient's or society's. Never-
theless, physicians and nurses should
be ashamed that the administrators
were out in front on this issue. Even
though it leaves much to be desired in
terms of completeness, specificity, and
enforceability the AHA Bill has tre-
mendous symbolic value in legitimiz-
ing the notion of rights in the health
care institution.' On the other hand,
fewer than half of all AHA-member
hospitals have formally adopted even
this bill, and the symbolic victory of
the 1970s is currently under attack.
The Attack on Patient Rights
Physicians, who perhaps value their
own professional autonomy more than
any other group, nevertheless devalue
it for their own patients. Instead, pa-
ternalism is the norm with the major-
ity of physicians who believe that the
health and continued life of their pa-
tients is much more important than
their patients' right to self-determina-
tion. This belief system not only leads
to conflicts with individual patients
about their own care, but also to a gen-
eral view that patients' rights are a lux-
ury item in medicine rather than a
necessity.
A few examples illustrate the point.
Two particular rights of patients have
recently come under attack in the
medical literature: access to medical
records and informed consent. In an
attack on "record reading," four psy-
chiatrists at Peter Bent Brigham Hos-
pital in Boston, Massachusetts, inter-
viewed the 11 out of 2,500 patients at
that hospital who, in a one year period,
asked to see their medical records.' It
is doubtful that anything of general
importance about a patient's reactions
to reading their charts can be learned
from an uncontrolled, non-blind, clin-
ically impressionistic study of those
few individuals who, for whatever rea-
son, buck a system which routinely
fails to inform them of their right of
access to their records. Nonetheless,
the authors' conclusion that such pa-
tients have a variety of personality de-
fects, usually manifesting themselves
in mistrust of and hostility toward the
hospital staff, should not be permitted
to go uncontested. In a setting where
trusting patients are not routinely told
of their right to access, it seems rea-
sonable to assume that only the least
trusting or most angry will ask to see
their records. To locate the source of
mistrust in the patient's personality or
in the stress of illness and hospi-
talization is to forget, as Dr. Lipsett
perceptively suggests, that "the doc-
tor-patient relationship cannot be un-
derstood simply in terms of the pa-
tient's side of the equation."i"
Airman, et al., thus fall into what Pro-
fessor Robert Burt, of Yale Law
School, has referred to as "the concep-
tual trap of attempting to transform
two-party relationships, in which mu-
tual self-delineations are inherently
confused and intertwined, by concep-
tually obliterating one party. ... ."I
Thus, it would seem that the ten
women who asked to read their charts
"to confirm the belief that the staff
harbored negative personal attitudes
toward them..." were correct in their
belief; the psychiatrists labelled them
"of the hysterical type with demand-
ing, histrionic behavior and emotional
over-involvement with the staff."
Altman, et. al., also seem unaware of
the wide variety of settings in which
patients have benefitted from routine
record access; and incorrectly assert
that there were no strikingly beneficial
effects in the two studies they do cite.
In the first study, for example, two pa-
tients expressed their unfounded fear
that they had cancer only after their
records were reviewed with them, and
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one pregnant patient noted an incor-
rect Rh typing that permitted Rho-
Gam to be administered at the time of
delivery.' 2 In the other study they cite,
50 percent of the patients made some
factual correction in their records.'
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In short, the study seems to have
been done and published for the pri-
mary purpose of proving that the right
to access one's medical record is unim-
portant since it is only exercised by
"mentally disturbed" people who are
not improved by reading their charts.
The study fails to prove this, and even
if it succeeded, I would still be unwill-
ing to deprive the other 2,489 patients
at that hospital of their right to access
in the future.
If we believe in individual freedom
and the concept of self-determination,
we must give all citizens the right to
make their own decisions and to have
access to the same information that is
widely available to those making deci-
sions about them. It is as irrelevant in
this connection that 2,489 patients at
the Brigham did not ask to see their
records as it is that more than 200 mil-
lion Americans never have had to
exercise their right to remain silent
when arrested. Rights serve us all,
whether we exercise them or not.
The attack on informed consent,
which many physicians have long con-
sidered a "legal fiction,"'I most re-
cently surfaced in a study designed to
prove that informed consent was not
an important practice because patients
could not remember what they were
informed of. 15 The methodology in-
volved interviewing 200 consecutive
cancer patients who had consented to
chemotherapy, surgery, or radiation
therapy for their cancers within 24
hours after they had signed consent
forms. Upon questioning, most could
not recall the procedure consented to,
its major risks, or the alternatives to it.
From this the authors conclude that
the process is not working and that in-
formed consent itself is suspect.
While this may seem a reasonable con-
clusion (although an alternative one is
simply that patients have poor recall),
it turns out that the authors presumed
their major premise. Approximately
two-thirds of their sample group (66
percent) opted for radiation therapy.
That group signed a consent form that
said "the procedure, its risks and bene-
fits and alternatives have been ex-
plained to me." Maybe they were, but
maybe they weren't. The authors did
not know, so their entire study was
based on a premise that was unsub-
stantiated. Such a poorly designed
study, it seems to me, could only be
published if the editors agreed so
strongly with the conclusion that they
did not even review the methodology.
A perhaps more interesting part of
the study asked the patients some gen-
eral questions about informed con-
sent. The first was "What are consent
forms for?" Approximately 80 percent
responded: "To protect the physicians'
rights." The authors were upset at this
response, but the patients, of course,
were correct. That is the primary func-
tion of forms. If one wants these forms
also to protect the patient, three
simple steps are necessary: (1) the
forms must be complete; (2) they must
be in lay language; and (3) the patients
must be given a copy of the form and
time to think over the information it
contains.i 6 The reason none of these is
usually done is clear: informed con-
sent is not taken seriously in the hospi-
tal setting. It is, like record access, a
luxury which is secondary to caring
for the medical "needs" of the patient,
and besides, it really does not matter
anyway because patients cannot re-
member anything they've been told.
Other significant findings indicate
the extent to which patients under-
stand and appreciate the consent proc-
ess: 80 percent thought the forms were
necessary; 76 percent thought they
contained just the right amount of in-
formation; 84 percent understood all
or most of the information; 75 percent
thought the explanations given were
important; and 90 percent said they
would try to remember the informa-
tion contained on the forms. To me,
this suggests that the patients sur-
veyed understood and appreciated the
informed consent process much better
than the researchers did. While their
data is certainly not flawless, one can
conclude from it just the opposite of
what the researchers did: for almost all
patients, informed consent is very
important.
Related to this general attack on
rights is an attack on the patient popu-
lation itself. The notion is that the
major problems with the health care
delivery system are not problems with
providers, but with patients. We eat
too much, smoke too much, don't
exercise, take too many risks, etc., and
so what do we expect when we get
sick? Not only must the American
health care enterprise deal with a bad
class of patients, but now they want
some say in what kind of care is pro-
vided! As Lewis Thomas has put it in a
related vein: this is becoming "folk
doctrine about disease. You become ill
because of not living right. If you get
cancer it is, somehow or other, your
own fault. If you didn't cause it by
smoking or drinking, or eating the
wrong things, it came from allowing
yourself to persist with the wrong
kind of personality in the wrong
environment.i 
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This attitude would be humorous if
it was not so pervasive and did not af-
fect patient care so profoundly. Mar-
tha Lear has given us some excellent
and telling examples in her deeply-
moving book, Heartsounds, that chron-
icles the final four years of life of her
physician-husband who goes through
eight operations and eleven hospi-
talizations during that period. To-
gether they identify the "it's your fault
ploy" which means that no matter
what goes wrong in the hospital set-
ting, it is the fault of the patient, not
the health care system:
Why did the operation take so
long?
Because you lost so much blood.
Not: Because the surgeon blew it.
Why do you keep making these
tests?
Because you have a very stubborn
infection.
Not: Because I can't diagnose
your case.
Why did I get sick again?
Because you were very weak.
Not: Because I did not treat you
competently the first time."
Dr. Lear is constantly asking him-
self if he treated patients that way, and
usually admits that he did. He suggests
that every physician be required to
spend at least a week per year in a hos-
pital bed: "That would change some
things in a hurry."
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An Agenda for the 80's
Since patients do have rights and do
want to exercise them, and since the
major attacks on the notion of pa-
tients' rights have been based on
sloppy studies and false premises, the
patients' rights movement is likely to
gain momentum. Indeed, the 1970s
can be most properly viewed as a dec-
ade in which the existence of patients'
rights became legitimized through ba-
sic education of the health care pro-
viders. I suggest that the 1980s will be
a decade in which the primary thrust
will be working on ways to directly en-
hance the status of patients in the hos-
pital as a means of humanizing the
hospital environment so that patients
can have a greater voice in how they
are treated.
I suggest the following five point
"agenda for the '80s:"
Patients' Rights Agenda
I. No Routine Procedures
2. Open Access to Medical Records
3. Twenty-Four-Hour-a-Day Visi-
tor Rights
4. Full Experience Disclosure
5. Effective Patient Advocate
1. No Routine Procedures: It is all too
common for nurses and others to re-
spond to the question, "Why is this
being done?" with, "Don't worry, it's
routine." This should not be an ac-
ceptable response. No procedure
should ever be performed on a patient
because it is routine; it should only be
performed if it is specifically indicated
for that patient. Thus routine admis-
sion tests, routine use of johnnies, rou-
tine use of wheelchairs for in-hospital
transportation, routine use of sleeping
pills, to name a few notable examples,
should be abolished. Use of these pro-
cedures means patients are treated as
fungible robots rather than as individ-
ual human beings. Moreover, these
procedures are often demeaning and
unnecessary.
2. Open Access to Medical Records:
While currently provided for by fed-
eral law and many state statutes and
regulations, open access to medical
records by patients remains difficult,
and a patient often asserts his right to
see his record at the peril of being
labeled "distrustful" or a "trouble-
maker." The information in the hospi-
tal chart is about the patient and prop-
erly belongs to the patient. The
patient must have access to it, both to
enhance his own decision-making
ability and to make it clear that the
hospital is an "open" institution that
is not trying to hide things from the
patient. Surely if hospital personnel
make decisions about the patient on
the basis of information in the chart,
the patient also deserves access to the
information.
3. Twenty-Four-Hour-a-Day Visitor
Rights: One of the most important
ways both to humanize the hospital
and to enhance patient autonomy is to
assure the patient that at least one per-
son of his choice has unlimited access
to him or her at any time of the day or
night. This person should also be per-
mitted to stay with the patient during
any procedure (e.g., childbirth or in-
duction of anesthesia) so long as the
person does not interfere with the care
of other patients.
4. Full Experience Disclosure: The
most important gain of the past dec-
ade has been the almost universal ac-
knowledgement of the need for the pa-
tient's informed consent.
Nevertheless, some information that is
material to the patient's decision is
still withheld: the experience of the
person doing the procedure.' 9 Pa-
tients have a right to know if the per-
son asking permission to draw blood,
take blood gases, do a bone marrow as-
piration, or do a spinal tap has ever
performed the procedure before, and
if so, what the person's complication
rate is. This applies not only to medi-
cal students and student nurses, but
also to board certified surgeons- we
all do things for the first time, and not
every patient wants to take such an ac-
tive role in our education.
5. An Effective Patient Advocate:
While a patients' bill of rights is nec-
essary, it is not sufficient. Rights are
not self-actualizing. Patients are sick
and desire relief from pain and dis-
comfort more than they demonstrate a
desire to exercise their rights; they are
also anxious, and may hold back com-
plaints for fear of retaliation. It is criti-
cal that patients have access to a per-
son whose job it is to work for the
patient to help the patient exercise the
rights outlined in the institution's bill
of rights. This person should sit in on
all major hospital committees that deal
with patient care, have authority to
obtain medical records for patients,
call consultants, launch complaints di-
rectly with all members of the hospital,
medical, nursing, and administrative
staff, and be able to delay discharges.
While there appear to be some suc-
cessful "patient representatives" that
are hired by the hospitals, it is not fair
to give them this title since they must
represent their employer- the hospi-
tal. It is likely that ultimately effective
representation can only be obtained
by someone who is hired by a con-
sumer group or governmental agency
outside the hospital in which the rep-
resentative works.
Conclusion
We have made a beginning in the long
journey toward humanizing the hospi-
tal and promoting patients' self-deter-
mination. But more specific measures
are needed before patients will be as-
sured that they can effectively exercise
their rights in institutional settings.
Like Poe's Arthur Gordon Pym, the
notion that patients have rights has
survived the days of darkness, isola-
tion, and starvation. Patients' rights
are now generally accepted (although
sporadically attacked) and it is up to
patients and providers alike to see to it
that these rights become a reality for
every citizen.
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